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Foreword: State Enforcement in an Interstate World 
Margaret H. Lemos* 
As befits a topic as rich and multifaceted as this one, this 
symposium brought together commentators from a range of 
backgrounds, each addressing the question of state enforcement 
from a different angle. Indeed, the very term “state enforcement” 
admits of multiple meanings. For some, it calls to mind affirmative 
litigation by state executive officials—enforcement activities that 
might overlap (or sometimes conflict) with those of officials from 
other states, or different officials from within the same state; or with 
efforts by federal officials or private lawyers and litigants. For other 
commentators, the term “state enforcement” conjures up images of 
state courts, which may provide venues for litigating actions that 
span state lines and often overlap (or sometimes conflict) with 
parallel actions in other courts. No matter how we tilt and turn it, 
however, the topic of state enforcement shines light on some of the 
most important challenges for our legal system today. What does it 
mean to say that a state—whether acting through its executive or 
judicial branch—has an interest in a set of legal claims? What are 
the costs and benefits of enforcement overlap, whether by multiple 
enforcers or by multiple courts? Which actors—state, federal, or 
private—are in the best position to represent the interests of state 
citizens in litigation? 
My own work has focused primarily on state enforcement in 
the first sense: I began by seeking to understand state litigation—
by which I mean litigation spearheaded by state officials (typically 
attorneys general, or AGs)—as an alternative to other, private, 
modes of representative litigation, particularly private class 
 
*   Senior Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Robert G. Seaks LL.B. ‘34 
Professor of Law, Duke University. Adapted from remarks delivered at the BYU Law 
Review’s Symposium on State Enforcement in an Interstate World, held on April 5, 2019. 
Thanks are owed to the Law Review and to Elysa Dishman and Paul Stancil for organizing 
a terrific event, and to participants in the symposium for illuminating comments and 
conversation. 
001.LEMOS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:25 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1428 
 
actions.1 One common argument in favor of the public alternative 
is that government is accountable whereas private litigants and 
lawyers are not.2 There is indeed something appealing about the 
idea of accountability in representative litigation. After all, a state 
AG can claim to represent citizens in two ways—both in the 
adjudicative sense of an attorney representing clients and in the 
political sense of an elected official representing citizens—and 
accountability seems key to the legitimacy of both modes of 
representation. Litigation can have substantial consequences for 
how the law actually operates on the ground, affecting not only the 
litigants themselves but also individuals and entities who have 
nothing to do with the case. Litigation can cause a great deal of 
money to change hands; it can cause regulated entities to change 
their behavior in significant ways;  it can cause governments to 
change their policies. So, it may seem only right and good that 
litigation be responsive to the public will in some way—that it be 
“accountable,” as the critics of private litigation like to say. 
But debates about state litigation have taken an interesting turn 
in more recent years, with critics now arguing that state AGs are too 
political.3 These critiques are not entirely new, but they have gained 
steam over the last decade or so as AGs have become more 
prominent and visible on the national scene. To be sure, if you look 
at the headlines, it is not hard to paint state litigation as a partisan 
affair, with blue-state AGs challenging national policies or business 
practices that are defended by their red-state counterparts—and 
vice versa.4 It is also clear that AG elections have become more 
expensive, more high-profile, and more hard-fought in recent 
years. Not all AG elections are expensive today, but some are very 
 
 1.  See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
698 (2011) (exploring the role states play, alongside private litigants, in enforcing various 
elements of federal law); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative 
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012) [hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate 
Litigation] (examining the relationship between private damages class actions and 
representative suits led by state attorneys general). 
 2.  See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 
637–38 (2013) (describing a common line of critique of private enforcement that “proceeds 
from a . . . basic pair of observations: public enforcers are politically accountable actors. 
Private enforcers are not”). 
 3.  See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of 
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 85 (2018) (describing critiques and citing examples). 
 4.  For an extended discussion of partisanship in state public law litigation, see 
generally id.  
001.LEMOS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:25 AM 
1427 State Enforcement in an Interstate World 
 1429 
 
expensive, with much of the money flowing in from outside the 
relevant state.5 The partisan AG organizations—RAGA and 
DAGA—are playing ever-larger roles, and raising more and more 
money.6 And both groups are deploying their money more 
aggressively after announcing in 2017 that they would end their 
longstanding “handshake agreement that they wouldn’t target 
seats held by incumbents from the other party.”7 In one 2017 race 
alone, RAGA and DAGA collectively spent about ten million dollars.8 
We also have good reason to believe that the trends toward 
polarization that have afflicted other parts of government have not 
bypassed AGs. Based on ideology scores gleaned from the 
campaign contributions AGs receive as candidates, it appears that 
AGs nowadays exhibit a high degree of so-called “partisan 
sorting”: that is, there is no overlap between the most conservative 
Democrats and the most liberal Republicans.9 The same data 
suggest that AGs are fairly polarized in the sense of “ideological 
divergence,” which has to do with the ideological distance between 
AGs from different parties.10 One study found that the AGs in office 
in 2009–10 were more ideologically extreme than the mean state 
legislator from their respective parties in thirty-five states.11 There 
is not much reason to think that ideological divergence has 
decreased over the last decade. 
It is a separate question, of course, whether trends in political 
polarization are being reflected in state litigation. It is easy to see 
why they might be. Some observers predict, for example, that the 
changes in AG elections will sharpen partisan divides and reduce 
 
 5.  See Lemos & Young, supra note 3, at 86–88 & Figs. 1–2 (documenting rise in mean 
and median total campaign contributions reported by AG candidates from 1990 to 2012). 
 6.  Dan Levine & Lawrence Hurley, Trump Bump: Court Fights Draw Big Money into 
Attorney General Races, REUTERS (July 31, 2017, 5:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-politics-attorneys-general/trump-bump-court-fights-draw-big-money-into-attorney-
general-races-idUSKBN1AG17K (describing spending in AG races and role of RAGA  
and DAGA). 
 7.  Alan Greenblatt, State AGs Used to Play Nice in Elections. Not Anymore., GOVERNING 
MAG. (Nov. 15, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-state-
attorneys-general-elections-2017-2018-raga-daga.html. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Lemos & Young, supra note 3, at 89–90 & Fig. 3. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 376 
(2014). 
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bipartisan cooperation.12 Similarly, the trend toward unified 
government in the states is likely to produce more polarization, and 
less bipartisanship, in state litigation. Until relatively recently, it 
was not uncommon to find Democratic AGs in otherwise “red” 
states.13 And, because most states had divided government, most 
AGs had to contend with an opposite-party legislature or governor. 
It stands to reason that AGs who hail from a different party than 
other state leaders will tend to take a more moderate approach to 
litigation than those who work in states with more one-sided 
politics. But those “purple” seats are becoming less common, as 
more states turn to unified government and more AG races follow 
suit. Of the thirty-one states with unified government in 2017, 
twenty-eight had same-party AGs.14 
Efforts to study polarization in the work of state AGs provide 
some support for these intuitions, but with important qual-
ifications. Most scholars who have studied the question have 
examined the extent to which AGs are taking positions that are 
shared only by their co-partisans, resulting in Democratic and 
Republican AGs pitted against each other on opposite sides of the 
same case, or arrayed in coalitions that are extremely lopsided. The 
results are mixed but do suggest that polarization is on the rise in 
AG litigation and advocacy.15 Context matters, however: the extent 
to which state litigation reflects polarization among AGs depends 
 
 12.  See Greenblatt, supra note 7. 
 13.  See Alan Greenblatt, Avengers General, GOVERNING MAG. (May 2003) (“There were 
only 12 Republican attorneys general in 1999, when RAGA was founded . . . .”). By 
comparison, there were twenty-seven Republican AGs in 2018. Attorney General (state 
executive office), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Attorney_General_(state_executive_ 
office) (last visited May 29, 2020) (showing party control of state AG seats). 
 14.  See Lemos & Young, supra note 3, at 91. 
 15.  See, e.g., PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND 
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 30–32 (2015) (reporting “wide 
partisan splits” between AGs in multistate litigation in the lower federal courts); Margaret 
H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General as Amici, 90 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1229 (2015) (studying partisan patterns among AGs who joined or opposed each other 
in amicus briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court between 1980 and 2013, and finding that the 
group of AGs joining or opposing a brief was significantly more or less Republican than 
would be expected from a random draw of AGs then in office, but only in recent years and 
mostly in cases in which groups of AGs weighed in on both sides); Paul Nolette, State 
Litigation During the Obama Administration: Diverging Agendas in an Era of Polarized Politics, 44 
PUBLIUS 451, 455–56 (2014) (studying cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court between 1993 
and 2013 in which multiple AGs filed briefs, and finding a “large spike” in interstate conflicts 
during the last four years of the sample, when states either squared off against each other or 
collaborated on briefs with a strong partisan slant in 35% of the relevant cases). 
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on the kind of cases at issue. For example, state litigation against 
business interests tends to be more bipartisan than state litigation 
against the federal government.16 
AGs’ own partisanship also may interact with other 
considerations in ways that are difficult—if not impossible—to 
tease out from the data alone. Take the example above: state 
litigation against corporations tends to be bipartisan. That pattern 
might suggest that suits against corporations are not “political.” Or 
it might reflect the fact that, when a major company is already 
settling with a large group of states, and when the main 
consequence of nonparticipation is exclusion from the settlement 
proceeds, other state AGs may see little advantage to sitting it out.17 
Most relevant for present purposes, some evidence suggests 
that AGs’ own partisan affiliations may be less significant—at least 
in some cases—than the ideological commitments of the state’s 
citizens or, perhaps, of other state officials.18 It follows (as I suggested 
earlier) that we might expect to see different behavior from a 
Democratic AG in an otherwise heavily Republican state than from 
a Democratic AG in a resoundingly “blue” state. And, as more 
states become more solidly “red” or “blue,” we might expect  
AGs to act in an increasingly partisan manner—as some of the  
data suggest. 
For the sake of argument, then, let us assume that AGs indeed 
are behaving “politically” in the sense that Democrats are doing 
meaningfully different things than Republicans—pursuing 
different cases, making different legal arguments. The question 
remains whether that is a bad thing.19 It is not immediately clear 
 
 16.  NOLETTE, supra note 15, at 28. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General Behavior in 
Multi-State Litigation, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 1, 15–17 (2010) (finding that AGs’ party 
affiliations did not significantly predict decisions to join a consumer-protection litigation 
when factors such as the number of consumer groups in the state and the ideology of state 
citizens were controlled for); Lemos & Quinn, supra note 15, at 1263–66 (exploring interplay 
between AGs’ own partisan commitments and those of state citizens and other state officials). 
 19.  In another work, Ernie Young and I have argued that partisan motivations should 
largely be irrelevant to a normative assessment of AG action: 
The objection to partisan motivations for state litigation seems to be that they 
render that litigation opportunistic. But it is hard to say why this sort of 
opportunism is necessarily a bad thing. In Federalist 51, Madison says that we’re 
counting on the selfish interests of particular officials to create incentives to protect 
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why it should be, especially if accountability is our goal. We tend 
to critique government officials for behaving politically when we 
want them to be impartial and independent—as with judges—but 
not when we want them to be accountable. Few of us are shocked 
and dismayed when we observe Democrats in Congress behaving 
differently from Republicans, for example. If partisan behavior is 
(usually) unproblematic for other kinds of political representatives, 
why should AGs be different? 
Answering that question requires unpacking both the notion of 
accountability as applied to the work of AGs and other government 
lawyers, and the nature of the representation they provide. We 
might begin by asking to whom and for what AGs are (or should be) 
accountable. When critics of private class actions invoke 
accountability as a comparative advantage of state-led litigation, 
they seem to mean that AGs are accountable to the public in their 
states, including the state citizens whose interests they represent in 
court. Class-action attorneys, by contrast, are largely unaccountable 
to their clients in aggregate litigation. The problem stems from two 
common features of class actions: first, class counsel often have 
financial incentives to maximize the fee-to-work ratio rather than 
the class recovery; and second, individual class members typically 
are unable and unwilling to monitor class counsel effectively. The 
lack of monitoring—coupled with the arguable conflict of interest—
permits opportunistic behavior by the attorneys, resulting in 
settlements that are inadequate or ineffective from the perspective 
of the class members but yield handsome fees for class counsel.20 
When the lawyers in question are government attorneys, these 
concerns seem to recede. AGs and other government attorneys are 
 
the institutional interests of the various parts of the government. Opportunism, in 
other words, is the foundation of both separation of powers and federalism. 
Lemos & Young, supra note 3, at 104; see also id. at 95–105 (explaining why partisan litigating 
patterns do not prove that AGs are using litigation to do anything other than advance their 
states’ long-term institutional interests). 
 20.  For seminal works on the agency problems in class actions, see generally, for 
example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 288 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 
62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications 
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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duty-bound to serve the public interest. Unlike their counterparts 
in the private bar, their salaries do not depend in a direct way on 
the outcome of any given case.21 Popular elections of AGs in most 
states supply additional incentives for such attorneys to do right by 
the people they serve.22 These and other differences between public 
and private attorneys may make AGs appear as ideal 
representatives—better, at least, than class-action counsel out to 
make a buck. Or so the argument goes. 
We can see this sort of intuition reflected in some judicial 
opinions—for example, those that hold that a class action is not a 
“superior” method for adjudicating claims if the government is also 
proceeding against the same defendant, on the view that 
“[p]roceedings by the state . . . are presumably taken with the best 
interests of state residents in mind.”23 Similar intuitions may 
animate decisions that set a higher bar to private intervention in 
cases being led by the government, again on the view—as one 
treatise puts it—that “a governmental entity is presumed to 
represent its citizens adequately.”24 Or, to take a final example, we 
might sense something similar in the relatively rare cases in which 
courts are called upon to assess the adequacy and fairness of 
government settlements. Here, too, courts emphasize that “the 
primary concern of the Attorneys General is the protection of and 
compensation for the States’ resident consumers, rather than 
insuring a fee for themselves . . . .”25 
 
 21.  For an overview of the conventional distinctions between public and private 
enforcement, see Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 1, at 704–07. 
 22.  Forty-three states provide for popular election of the attorney general. In the 
remaining states, the attorney general is appointed by the legislature (Maine), by the state 
supreme court (Tennessee), or by the governor (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, and Wyoming). William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State 
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006). 
 23.  Thornton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 1:06-CV-00018, 2006 WL 3359482, 
at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006); see Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 1, at 505–07 & 
nn.80–85 (discussing cases). 
 24.  6 EDWARD J. BRUNET, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.03[4][a][v][A] (3d ed. 2007). 
 25.  In re Minolta Camera Prods. Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp. 456, 460 (D. Md. 1987); 
see also New York v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that attorneys 
general in representative actions are motivated by concern for enforcement of the law); In re 
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 380 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Opinion of 
experienced and informed [counsel] should be afforded substantial consideration, and 
particularly here, the Court may place greater weight on such opinion in addressing a 
settlement negotiated by government attorneys committed to protecting the public interest.” 
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My work has sought to complicate this picture by showing that 
AG-led litigation does not—indeed, cannot—avoid the agency 
problems that bedevil private class actions.26 The core difficulty is 
that the public interest that the government is obligated to serve is 
different from the private interests at stake in representative 
litigation. The broader public includes defendants and potential 
defendants who would prefer to minimize, rather than maximize, 
payouts. It includes citizens who think that other cases are more 
important and government resources should be devoted elsewhere. 
Thus, one does not have to cast aspersions on the professionalism, 
dedication, or skill of government attorneys in order to see the 
potential for a conflict between the two sets of interests the 
government is supposed to serve in representative litigation: the 
public interest on the one hand, and the more private interest in 
compensation on the other.27 
Viewed in this light, anxieties about partisanship or 
polarization in AG litigation begin to take more definite shape. AGs 
represent their entire states, not just those citizens who voted for 
them and share their ideological commitments. Starkly partisan 
patterns in AG litigation might suggest that AGs are paying 
insufficient attention to the interests of citizens from the opposite 
party. As Ernie Young and I have argued elsewhere, “[t]his 
representation problem is, of course, endemic to all unitary 
decisionmakers elected on a winner-take-all basis.”28 Yet “the 
problem feels different when the relevant elected official is a 
lawyer, and the people of the state are not just his constituents but 
his clients.”29 Even if we believe that periodic elections provide an 
effective mechanism for holding AGs accountable to voters, 
opposite-party citizen-clients may find themselves largely left out 
 
(citation omitted)); In re Toys R Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he 
participation of the State Attorneys General furnishes extra assurance that consumers’ 
interests are protected.”). 
 26.  See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 1. 
 27.  See Elysa Dishman, Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions and Agency Dilemmas, 
SSRN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3252149 (elaborating on the agency 
dilemmas that can arise when AGs band together to bring multistate representative actions, 
thereby layering one form of claim-aggregation on another). 
 28.  Lemos & Young, supra note 3, at 115. 
 29.  Id. 
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of the conversation, at least in states where the AG seat is reliably 
blue or red.30 
An additional reason to worry about partisanship in AG 
litigation, even if we tolerate partisan behavior from other 
government officials, is that AGs embody (or should embody) a 
different model of representation than, say, legislative represen-
tatives. Put somewhat differently, we might question the premise 
that “accountability” is the goal when state officials are acting as 
lawyers rather than lawmakers. 
To see the intuition here, imagine a state that elects its judges. 
The Supreme Court held in Chisom v. Roemer that elected state 
judges are “representatives” within the meaning of § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act.31 The decision triggered a dissent by Justice Scalia, who 
rejected the notion that judges “represent” the people in the sense 
of acting on their behalf.32 Even the majority expressed discomfort 
with the notion that judges (elected or not) would be responsive to 
public opinion.33 That notion is indeed hard to square with the 
independence we tend to expect of judges. Due process demands 
that judges and other officials who perform adjudicative tasks be 
neutral and impartial—favoritism toward one or the other party is 
disqualifying, and outside influences are strictly curtailed.34 Judges 
are not supposed to be responsive to popular preferences; on the 
contrary, we expect them to “apply the law without fear or favor”35 
and, when necessary, to “stand up to what is generally supreme in 
a democracy: the popular will.”36 
Are AGs more like judges, or more like the Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress we considered earlier? I have argued that 
 
 30.  See id. (“Representation of all the states’ citizens often depends on the partisan 
alignments in the state, which will determine whether the AG must compete for the median 
voter or play to her party base.”). 
 31. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396–97 (1991). 
 32.  Id. at 410–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he judge represents the Law—which often 
requires him to rule against the People.”). 
 33.  See id. at 400–01 (majority opinion) (“[I]deally public opinion should be irrelevant 
to the judge’s role because the judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, 
popular sentiment.”). 
 34.  See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1980) (emphasizing the “power-
ful and independent constitutional interest in fair adjudicative procedure” and the “strict 
requirements” of neutrality for adjudicators). 
 35.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015). 
 36.  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 
(1989). 
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they are a bit like both, which makes the question of accountability 
substantially more difficult than it first might appear.37 On the one 
hand, litigation and enforcement entail the sorts of policy 
judgments that characterize legislation and regulation. No AGs 
have the resources to pursue every possible violation of the law; 
they must set priorities and goals and pick their cases carefully. 
That would be true even if the law were perfectly determinate—if 
there were one correct answer to every legal question—which is 
plainly not the reality. Like other advocates, AGs must select from 
among a spectrum of colorable legal arguments those that best 
advance the interests of their clients. But unlike other advocates, 
AGs’ clients—the state and its citizens38—may not be in a position 
to specify their interests on every issue, or offer direction on “the 
objectives of representation.”39 Necessarily, therefore, the job of the 
AG involves a significant element of discretion, going well beyond 
technocratic judgments about what the law is to policy-inflected 
choices about what the law should be and how it should operate on 
the ground. It seems not only inevitable but appropriate that such 
choices be “political” in some sense—that they be informed by the 
views of other state officials and citizens. 
On the other hand, certain aspects of litigation and law 
enforcement seem more akin to judging than to lawmaking, 
making the strongest versions of popular control appear inapt. 
Enforcement decisions are not just made at wholesale; in actual 
day-to-day practice, lawyering in the name of the state is a retail 
endeavor. Having determined to devote public resources to 
combatting elder fraud, for example, enforcers must then decide to 
 
 37.  See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and 
Independence for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929 (2017) [hereinafter Lemos, 
Democratic Enforcement] (arguing for a theory of public accountability for civil law 
enforcement that make sense of enforcement’s similarities to both legislation and 
adjudication). 
 38.  The clients in public enforcement actions typically are government officials and 
institutions who are themselves bound to serve the public interest. And, in some cases, the 
only “client” is the public itself. See Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” 
in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 269 (2000) (“Whether one views the client as the 
government, a government agency[,] or a government official, the client is distinctive in at 
least this respect: the client owes fiduciary duties to the public . . . .”); NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS 
GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 83 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 
2013) (explaining that, in various areas, AGs “have been given independent enforcement 
duties to advance and to protect ‘the public interest’ through litigation”). 
 39.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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pursue this offender or that one, to seek these remedies or those. 
Such decisions implicate the interests of identifiable individuals 
and firms, simultaneously reducing the relevance and value of 
public input40 and triggering concerns that popular sentiment may 
reflect favoritism or vindictiveness.41 The individualized and 
retroactive nature of enforcement distinguishes it from prospective, 
generally applicable lawmaking and complicates the answer to the 
accountability question. There is something decidedly uncomfort-
able in the notion that the state’s choice of enforcement targets—
and of penalties in each case—should be subject to public, or 
political, whim. As I have argued elsewhere, “[m]uch as we would 
decry a judicial decision based on the public’s desire to punish a 
particular defendant, we should disapprove of enforcement decis-
ions that echo the angry mob.”42 
All of this may help explain why the word “political” serves as 
an effective rhetorical tool when applied to the work of AGs and 
other government attorneys, despite the undeniably discretionary 
nature of their jobs.43 Yet I doubt that many close observers of 
public enforcement would insist that AGs should be independent, 
in the mold of federal judges (who of course do not stand for 
popular, partisan election), blinding themselves entirely to public 
sentiment in the manner of Lady Justice. The challenge is to strike 
the right balance between accountability—or responsiveness to the 
public will—and the principled exercise of independent legal 
judgment. Reasonable minds will differ on the details.44 On any 
 
 40.  See Lemos, Democratic Enforcement, supra note 37, at 961–64 (explaining why public 
opinion will often be unhelpful for guiding individual enforcement decisions). 
 41.  See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2363 (2001) 
(arguing that the different due process rules for lawmaking and adjudication turn on “a 
distinction between relatively open-ended policymaking . . . and relatively circumscribed 
resolution of discrete claims involving identifiable firms or individuals”). 
 42.  Lemos, Democratic Enforcement, supra note 37, at 964 
 43.  The criticism is not reserved for state AGs, of course, but also is levied against 
their counterparts in the federal government. See, e.g., Michael W. Dolan, Political Influence 
on the Department of Justice: Are the Pressures Only External?, 9 J.L. & POL. 309, 312 (1993) (“Rare 
is the federal prosecutor who has not been described by his or her enemies as politically 
ambitious . . . .”); Lincoln Caplan, Hyper Hacks: What’s Really Wrong With the Bush Justice 
Department, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2007/03/hyper_hacks.html (criticizing the second Bush Administration for 
its “disdain for the nonpolitical tradition of federal law enforcement”). 
 44.  For my own attempt at reconciliation, see Lemos, Democratic Enforcement, supra 
note 37, at 943–68. 
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account that recognizes some role for accountability, however, it is 
critical to move the discussion beyond the plane of platitude and 
ask whether adequate mechanisms are in place to secure 
meaningful, and meaningfully democratic, accountability. That 
project has both an affirmative element—fostering accountability to 
the state’s citizens—and a negative element—guarding against the 
risk that AGs will be unduly influenced by narrow interests or 
improper considerations. For example, we might seek to facilitate 
transparency about what AGs are doing and why, so that voters 
can make informed decisions. We might also consider how AG 
elections might be regulated, either by managing the money 
coming in on the front end or developing rules for recusal at the 
back end, as many states have done for elected judges. And we 
might take a page from administrative law, where scholars and 
policymakers have thought a great deal about capture and how to 
minimize it, using tools like sunshine regulations and restrictions 
on lobbying. Such tools promote democratic accountability—and 
protect against influence that is “political” in the pejorative sense—
by ensuring that input is truly public.45 
But what if the statute in question was enacted by Congress 
rather than the state legislature, with the support of the state’s 
representatives in Congress? That question is the topic of Anthony 
Johnstone’s illuminating article, A State Is a “They,” Not an “It.”46 
Johnstone focuses on the series of high-profile challenges to the 
federal Affordable Care Act (ACA). In each of those cases, state 
AGs squared off against each other along largely partisan lines. But 
other state actors offered different “verdict[s] on the Act.”47 For 
example, in some states the congressional delegation supported the 
Act only to see the AG challenge it as an unconstitutional abuse of 
Congress’s power to tax or regulate interstate commerce. In others, 
state legislators voted to expand Medicaid coverage pursuant to the 
Act, while the AG argued that the Medicaid expansion exceeded 
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. And some state 
legislatures opted into the federal regulatory plan by establishing 
 
 45.  See id. at 979–1000 (expanding on these themes). 
 46.  See generally Anthony Johnstone, A State Is a “They,” Not an “It”:Intrastate Conflicts 
in Multistate Challenges to the Affordable Care Act, 2019 BYU L. REV. 1471.  
 47.  Id. at 1476. 
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state-run healthcare exchanges, even as their AGs sought to render 
the Act a dead letter. 
As Johnstone emphasizes, these different political actors all 
speak for the state and its citizens, though the messages they send 
may be quite divergent. His goal is to push federalism scholars to 
attend to the pluralism of representatives within the state. But 
Johnstone’s analysis also points to some of the difficult normative 
questions about the place of AGs in state government, and the 
considerations that drive their choices. Some of the same critics 
who have criticized AGs for behaving politically have argued that 
AGs in recent years have strayed too far from their traditional role 
“as representatives of their states”—a role that centered on 
vindicating the long-term, institutional interests of states qua 
states.48 Rather than focusing on threats to state autonomy, AGs 
today may be pushing for more federal regulation or supporting 
claims “of individuals as opposed to the states themselves.”49 The 
ACA litigation is an example of this phenomenon. As Johnstone 
describes, the initial constitutional challenge to the ACA was 
initiated by Republican AGs. The challenge took the form of a 
“vertical” conflict between the states and the federal government, a 
clash over “who decides,” with the states arguing for autonomy to 
make policy choices for themselves rather than submitting to a 
federal plan.50 Yet many other states—led by Democratic AGs—
also showed up to defend the ACA, arguing in the name of their 
states in favor of federal regulation. At first blush, the Democratic 
defenders appear to be engaging in precisely the behavior critics 
have highlighted: rather than defending the states’ “right to go 
[their] own way,”51 they deployed the state’s legal resources in an 
effort to lock in a policy position they happened to favor. From that 
perspective, the Democrats seem to be pursuing a “horizontal 
conflict” in which one group of states attempts to use the  
federal government as a tool for imposing their policy preferences 
on other states.52 
 
 48.  NOLETTE, supra note 15, at 200. 
 49.  Id. at 30–31, 200–01. 
 50.  Lemos & Young, supra note 3, at 97. 
 51.  Id. at 95. 
 52.  Id. at 96–97. 
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On closer inspection, however, the distinction between vertical 
and horizontal conflicts breaks down. While the Republican-led 
challenge to the ACA looks like an effort to lift the shackles of 
federal regulation, leaving individual states free to adopt similar 
plans or even single-payer systems, defenders of the Act argued 
that the interstate healthcare market is so interconnected that no 
state could feasibly impose such requirements on its own. If that is 
correct, it follows that an ACA-type regime expanding healthcare 
coverage for all could only be done at the national level. In that 
sense, the conflict was unavoidably a horizontal one: blue states 
favoring such a regime had to use the federal government to 
achieve their goal by requiring dissenting states to conform. And 
by arguing the national government lacked power to enact the 
ACA, the red states effectively sought to force the blue states to 
stick with the prior, less universal system. 
The key point is that—in the ACA case and many others like 
it—there is an essential connection between the states’ institutional 
interest in autonomy and their immediate policy goals. 
Interdependence among the states means that states often will be 
able to vindicate short-term policy interests only via national 
cooperation. In other words, the best (sometimes the only) way for 
states to promote their own autonomy may be to push for, not 
against, federal intervention. As Ernie Young and I have argued, 
“[f]or this reason, states have an institutional interest in ensuring 
that the national government is strong enough—and has broad 
enough powers—to help them out with regulatory problems they 
can’t effectively address on their own.”53 
Professor Johnstone’s article complicates this analysis by 
highlighting the question of who—among various state actors—
should decide what the state’s short-term policy goals are. It is no 
answer to say that AGs decide questions of law while legislative 
representatives in Congress and the statehouse decide questions of 
policy, because in cases like the ACA challenge, one’s view of the 
law may well turn on one’s view of good policy. If a state’s 
congressional delegation voted in favor of the ACA—perhaps on 
the view that the interconnected healthcare market demanded a 
nationwide solution—should that foreclose the state AG from 
 
 53.  Id. at 100 (emphasis omitted). 
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mounting a legal challenge that hinges on a rejection of that view? 
If a state’s congressional delegation voted against the ACA—
perhaps on the view that the individual mandate and other 
requirements of the Act reflected a misguided approach to the 
challenge of securing affordable and effective healthcare for state 
citizens—should that foreclose the state AG’s defense of the Act? 
Or are states and their citizens best served by having multiple 
different representatives who can speak for the state on intertwined 
questions of law and policy? 
The contribution by Professors David Hyman and William 
Kovacic, State Enforcement in a Polycentric World, focuses on a 
similar kind of pluralism: regulatory and enforcement overlap 
among different agencies.54 Although their examples are drawn 
from the federal government, the point translates easily to the state 
level: in many areas, “regulatory and enforcement authority is . . . 
divided and shared within and across agencies.”55 That point is 
essential to any meaningful understanding of state enforcement—
or public enforcement more broadly. Although it is tempting to 
contrast the anarchic world of private enforcement to an idealized 
model of public enforcement that is both centralized and 
coordinated,56 the reality is much messier. We are seeing a version 
of this play out in the opioid litigation, which has brought state AGs 
into conflict with lawyers for cities and counties over the right to 
represent residents of municipal subdivisions and to raise claims 
that—some AGs argue—”belong to” the states.57 Similar overlap—
and potential for conflict—exists between states and the federal 
government, as both governments may seek to represent the same 
citizens and enforce the same laws. State citizens are federal citizens 
too, and state AGs play an important role in enforcing various 
 
 54.  David Hyman & William Kovacic, State Enforcement in a Polycentric World, 2019 
BYU L. REV. 1447. 
 55.  Id. at 1449. 
 56.  See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 1, at 704 (discussing the 
conventional view of public enforcement as centralized). 
 57.  Petition for Writ of Mandamus of State of Ohio at 1, In re: National Prescription 
Opiate Litigation State of Ohio, No. 19-3827 (2019), https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/ 
Files/Briefing-Room/News-Releases/Petition-for-Writ-of-Mandamus.aspx; Brief of Amici 
Curiae States of Mich. et al in Support of the State of Ohio’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus, 
In re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation State of Ohio, No. 19-3827 (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Briefing-Room/News-Releases/2019-09-06-
Michigan-Amicus-in-Support-of-Ohio-Peti.aspx. 
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provisions of federal law, as well as state laws that “mirror” federal 
requirements.58 As Hyman and Kovacic document, within the 
federal government—and likewise within each state—different 
agencies and officials may share authority for regulating the same 
class of conduct, and for litigating related claims. Last but not least, 
the various forms of public enforcement—local, state, and  
federal—may overlap with private rights of action that empower  
non-governmental individuals and groups to sue alongside their  
public representatives. 
The million-dollar question, of course, is whether such poly-
centrism is a feature or a bug. Hyman and Kovacic note the 
potential for “friction, conflict, and inconsistency” that comes from 
regulatory and enforcement overlap.59 Additional problems may 
include irreconcilable demands on regulated parties, inefficiency, 
and duplication of effort. But as other scholars have argued, 
redundancy may also have some advantages. Zachary Clopton, for 
example, has made a persuasive case that overlapping public and 
private enforcement authority “may respond to errors, resource 
constraints, information problems, or agency costs at the level of 
case selection,” while overlapping litigation—multiple lawsuits by 
different actors targeting the same behavior—may help counteract 
poor case outcomes such as “undervalued settlements or judg-
ments resulting from agent (under-) performance.”60 Consistent 
with this analysis, Hyman and Kovacic reject proposals to reduce 
state-federal overlap by “vesting sole responsibility in federal 
agencies” with “automatic preemption of state efforts and partici-
pation.”61 Instead, they argue that “the benefits of decentralized 
authority—notably, useful policy experimentation and proto-
typing, the supplementation of federal resources with state 
funding, and a critical safeguard against simultaneous fifty-state 
catastrophic failure—warrants continuation of a significant state 
role in multiple policy domains.”62 
 
 58.  See generally Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 1. 
 59.  Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 54, at 1449. 
 60.  Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285, 
290 (2016). 
 61.  Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 54, at 1465. 
 62.  Id. 
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Yet policy experimentation is unlikely to accomplish much 
good without systems in place to ensure that the results of the 
experiments—what works, what doesn’t, and why—are commun-
icated to other “labs.” Hyman and Kovacic therefore propose 
expanding the use of opt-in networks to connect enforcers and 
regulators with overlapping jurisdictions, encouraging periodic 
consultations, the establishment of working groups and inter-
agency guidelines and protocols, and the organization of events 
such as hearings and conferences on topics of mutual concern.63 
Enhanced networking, they argue, not only enhances policy 
coordination, but “can convert a collection of flatter learning curves 
into a single steeper learning curve that enables all participating 
institutions to make progress more quickly.”64 
Professor Linda Mullenix’s contribution to this symposium 
likewise explores themes of jurisdictional overlap and potential 
conflict. Picking up on the second meaning of state “enforcement,” 
however, her article, The (Surprisingly) Prevalent Role of States in an 
Era of Federalized Class Actions, focuses on judicial rather than 
executive actors.65 Mullenix begins by detailing the push to reduce 
such overlap by federalizing class actions and other forms of 
complex litigation. The arguments in favor of federalization echoed 
now-familiar refrains about the downsides of enforcement 
overlap—including inefficiency, duplication of effort, and 
inconsistent judgments. In addition, defendants complained that 
state courts were too lax in granting class certification, creating 
“judicial hellholes” that served as magnets for forum-shopping 
plaintiffs.66 The defense bar won an important triumph in the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which expanded federal 
diversity jurisdiction and removal for class actions. 
Although the federalization part of the story is fairly well 
known, Mullenix’s article adds important nuance by demon-
strating how courts (both state and—more surprisingly—federal) 
have slowed the push toward centralization, maintaining pockets 
of state autonomy and independence. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
 
 63.  See id. at 1446. 
 64.  Id. at 1467. 
 65.  Linda S. Mullenix, The (Surprisingly) Prevalent Role of States in an Era of Federalized 
Class Actions, 2019 BYU L. REV. 1551. 
 66.  Id. at 1554. 
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held, for example, that state courts may maintain class litigation 
even after a federal court has ruled against certification in that same 
litigation. In the converse set of circumstances—where state law 
would prohibit class treatment of particular claims—several lower 
federal courts have refused to treat federal Rule 23 as a trump, 
instead following state law. The Supreme Court also interpreted 
CAFA not to apply to actions brought by state AGs as parens patriae 
on behalf of state citizens—actions that bear a striking practical 
resemblance to private class actions but are procedurally distinct.67 
And CAFA itself carves out a role for state AGs (in approving class 
settlements) and for state courts (in managing certain complex 
cases). As Mullenix explains, some federal courts have liberally 
construed the latter set of carve-outs, “conserv[ing] a role for  
state courts to maintain jurisdiction over class litigation originally  
filed there.”68 
With these and other doctrinal moves, courts have preserved a 
place for states in the landscape of complex litigation—a landscape 
that, Mullenix shows, is considerably more complicated than the 
prevailing post-CAFA narrative of federalization would suggest. 
As with the other types of enforcement overlap detailed in this 
volume, Mullenix suggests that overlapping state and federal court 
jurisdiction can generate valuable information and improve 
outcomes and fairness.69 Although such federalism-related values 
may not be at the forefront of judges’ minds, perhaps “the Court, in 
recognizing the autonomy of state courts to resolve complex 
litigation, may implicitly have been countering the ‘affront to 
federalism’ that is embodied in CAFA.”70 
In Class Actions, Jurisdiction, and Principle in Doctrinal Design, 
David Marcus and Will Ostrander take up a different set of 
questions for class actions in an interstate system, concerning which 
state is empowered to adjudicate complex multistate litigation.71 
 
 67.  For a description of state parens patriae actions and comparison to private class 
actions, see Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 1, at 493–501. 
 68.  Mullenix, supra note 65, at 1590. 
 69.  Id. at 1620 (citing J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action 
Era: The Problems and Promise of Non-Removable State Actions in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J. 
TORT L. 3 (2012)). 
 70.  Id. at 1622. 
 71.  David Marcus & Will Ostrander, Class Actions, Jurisdiction, and Principle in 
Doctrinal Design, 2019 BYU L. REV. 1511, 1515. 
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Specifically, Marcus and Ostrander focus on two jurisdictional 
puzzles. The first concerns personal jurisdiction and the 
requirement that the plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum. When the case is a class 
action, must each class member’s claim satisfy the jurisdictional 
requirement, or is it enough if the named plaintiff’s claim bears the 
requisite relationship to the defendant and the forum? The second 
question concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether a 
named plaintiff has standing under Article III to sue on behalf  
of members of a class when her injury differs from theirs in  
particular ways. 
These questions are puzzling for numerous reasons, but Marcus 
and Ostrander have a bigger point to make. Thus, although they 
offer solutions to both puzzles, their goal is to illuminate a tension 
between class action theory and “principled doctrinal design.”72 As 
they explain, proponents long have advocated a “regulatory” 
understanding of class actions—a view that sees class actions as 
“vehicles for law enforcement” and measures success in terms of 
deterrence.73 Skeptics, meanwhile, describe class actions as 
mechanisms for “conflict resolution.”74 For these theorists, “the 
class action does little more than join individual claims for the 
purposes of adjudicative efficiency. Class-wide litigation must 
respect preexisting features of these discrete claims, even if 
attention to them precludes class certification or otherwise creates 
considerable expense.”75 
Class action proponents, naturally, would prefer for class 
actions to be robust and effective devices for achieving regulatory 
ends while skeptics would prefer to cabin class litigation. Yet, 
Marcus and Ostrander show that while the logic of the regulatory 
framework produces a class-facilitating answer to the personal 
jurisdiction question, the same logic leads to a restrictive, class-
limiting answer to the standing question. The logic of the conflict-
resolution approach likewise generates split outcomes (albeit in the 
opposite direction): a restrictive rule for personal jurisdiction and a 
class-facilitating approach to subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 
 72.  Id. at 1545. 
 73.  Id. at 1511–12. 
 74.  Id. at 1512. 
 75.  Id. 
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As such, Marcus and Ostrander’s contribution stands as an 
important bookend to a volume devoted to theorizing about state 
enforcement. It is a reminder that efforts to theorize complicated 
phenomena may ultimately lead us away from full understanding 
if we become so wedded to the theory that we lose sight of the 
relevant phenomenon itself—if, in other words, the theory becomes 
the source of reasoning rather than the product of it. “Principled 
lawmaking,” Marcus and Ostrander write, “can proceed one 
procedural problem at a time, without concern for consistency with 
a vague set of theoretical priors. A pragmatic, consequences-
oriented approach to doctrinal administration, after all, is in the 
DNA of modern American civil procedure.”76 The articles in this 
symposium exemplify that approach, exploring various aspects of 
state enforcement in operation and from the ground up. 
 
 
 76.  Id. at 1545–46. 
